The US and India: Friends with Benefits

Somewhere Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is laughing. As the scourge of anti-nuclear activists, Mr Ahmadinejad must enjoy watching the US wiggle its way through the global restrictions on nuclear trade to cement a deal with India. Back in 2005, President Bush and Indian PM Manmohan Singh inked a civilian nuclear agreement that signaled strategic coöperation on atomic energy.

At the time, the agreement was a marked departure from US policy regarding states that have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, like India. Unlike North Korea and Iran (both have signed the NPT but seem habitual violators), India's nuclear weapons are technically legal. Nevertheless, the south Asian state is experiencing a shortage of domestically produced uranium, needed in both civilian and military capacities. 

With India a rising economic power and a potential bulwark against China, the US is eager to help Mr Singh resolve his problem. American Undersecretary of State, William Burns, is presently lobbying members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Vienna to allow trade with India. The NSG is designed to prevent the exchange of fuels and technology with countries that, like India, develop a bomb without agreeing to the internationally recognized safeguards for nuclear facilities.

Not surprisingly, the NSG is hesitant to undo 34 years of multilateral restrictions. Proponents, primarily those representing Washington's interests, claim that the second-most populous nation on earth needs nuclear fuel to satisfy exploding energy demand. Security officials claim that the accord would legitimate, and thus provide control over, India's nuclear program. The 45-member NSG has not been entirely receptive to such arguments. Nor should it.

Unlike the five recognized nuclear powers (US, Britain, France, Russia, and China), India never signed the test ban treaty and has no intentions of ending the production of fissile material for bomb making. Even if India acquires uranium on the open market for its civilian needs, more of its domestic production could be funneled towards weapons development. What is more, India has said that it will only agree to inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) where and when it deems appropriate. Such a policy fundamentally undercuts the potential for snap inspections by the IAEA to monitor India's nuclear facilities. 

In an effort to lift the restrictions while Messrs Bush and Singh are still in office, Washington has worked quickly to allay some of the members' fears. In particular, many observers are concerned that India would resume nuclear testing, similar to its "Operation Shatki" in 1998. Even as the US tightens the rule-waiver, it realizes the potential backlash in India. Parliamentary officials are in a row over the disclosure of a secret letter from the US State Department to Congress. Increased restrictions (including specific prohibition of nuclear testing) have come as an unwelcome surprise to many Indians who received a much more laissez faire impression of the deal from Mr Singh. 

Once again the US has put itself at odds with an international organization, and once again the consequences seem pervasive. Whatever suasion American leadership still had on non-proliferation will surely evaporate with the creation of this loophole. Even with the legitimate security concerns for India's nuclear program, the NSG waiver sends the wrong message to those watching closely. Not only does the US position coddle the obstinacy of Iran and North Korea, but it makes life more difficult for the IAEA to regulate emerging nuclear states like Brazil. 

All too often, statesmen are slaves to their own ego. Surely a game of playing favorites is no way to solve the nuclear problems of our time.