Israel's Airstrikes: A Product of Opportunism

Back on December 19, the Palestinian group Hamas formally ended its six-month ceasefire with Israel. The move was widely anticipated, and many regional analysts suggested that Hamas had simply used the period of calm to stockpile weapons and train fighters. By most accounts, the recent ceasefire was no stepping stone to peace, but rather a brief respite before intensified fighting.

There was little surprise, then, when Palestinian militants quickly began firing Qassam rockets and mortar shells from the Gaza strip into southern Israeli towns like Sderot. The reaction of the Israeli government, however, has shocked many in the international community. Over the past weekend, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) carried out a series of aggressive air strikes that have killed more than 300 Palestinians, and military officials appear to be planning an extensive ground campaign. On Sunday, the Israeli government just approved an emergency measure to call up some 7,000 reservists to assist a broadening operation.

As with any asymmetrical conflict, there have been an alarming number of civilian casualties as a result of the IDF attacks. The air strikes have hit the Islamic University in Gaza, a Hamas-owned television station, and a local mosque which Israelis claimed was being used to house terrorists. As military action continues, the sprawling collateral damage affects homes and neighborhoods throughout the Hamas-controlled territory.

There are basically three explanations for the current Israeli operations in Gaza. First, the government in Jerusalem is struggling with its own internal turmoil and facing elections in February. In September Prime Minister Ehud Olmert resigned in the face of corruption charges, but he still remains in office as the interim minister until elections. A slew of well-known candidates is vying for the top job, and the current hostilities in Gaza are sure to become a major part of the campaign.

The low-level violence coming out of Gaza (even during the ceasefire) has continually outraged Israelis living in border towns. The incessant air raid sirens that scream out when rockets are approaching have caused many citizens to question their government's recent restraint. For the ruling Kadima party, a successful military operation against Hamas would serve as a bulwark against the hawkish criticisms of former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (a political rival who is running for PM).

Other analysts point to the long shadow of Israel's 2006 war againt Hezbollah. In that conflict, the Israeli military conducted a sloppy 34-day assault on southern Lebanon. Despite attacks by sea, land, and air, the conflict revealed Hezbollah's sophisticated operational organization and brought the Iranian-backed Islamist group massive prestige in the Arab world. For many Israelis, the Hezbollah war had frayed the notion of military deterrence and such weakness had emboldened militants in Gaza. As such, the current strikes against Hamas are obviously designed to redress recent charicatures of Israel as a paper tiger.

Third, the global political climate seems to have provided Israel with an attractive opportunity to attack Hamas. The United States, which is often considered a moderating force in such conflicts, is ill-equipped to handle a diplomatic crisis. President George Bush has little power to broker any substantive deal during his remaining weeks, and President-elect Barack Obama is keenly focused on the American economy. The European Union, another diplomatic heavyweight, is days away from a presidential rotation. On December 31, French President Nicolas Sarkozy will give way to Czech President Vaclav Klaus (an admitted euro-skeptic). With all due respect, it's hard to imagine a strong, unified voice coming from the EU any time soon.

As a result, Israel may well continue bombing against the uneasy backdrop of strongly-worded statements from various global leaders. Mr Olmert could see this conflict as an opportunity to salvage his fractured legacy and bring substantive changes to the Gaza strip. Curiously, Mr Olmert has explicitly denied any attempts to force Hamas from power. Some analysts have suggested that the alternative, a functionally lawless and hostile territory at Israel's doorstep, would be measurably worse.

Still, the problem remains: Hamas is a much better combat party. After seizing control of Gaza in 2007, the party has been unable to provide for its citizens (albeit, there are obvious external forces at play) and alienated foreign supporters. In contrast, the militant wing of Hamas, the al-Qassam Brigades, has always thrived on its violent conflicts with Israel and will almost assuredly gain recruits as a result of the current hostilities. Just as Israel's political machine is looking to score points with the air strikes in Gaza, so too will Hamas be able to distract observers from its governing failures. Instead, many in the Arab world will focus on the need for Hamas to stand up and protect Palestinians in Gaza.

It seems unlikely that Israel would continue this fighting for more than a month, as it did in 2006. For one, economic realities may soon hamstring military options. Israel's currency, the shekel, weakened against the dollar this morning and the Bank of Israel has just issued a rather gloomy economic forecast. Still, the coming days and weeks could be very bloody and will surely leave Gaza in tatters.

It's hard to see how anyone will bring real change to the region, but it may, at some point, be Mr Obama's job to try.

2008: Global Markets Review

What a difference a year makes. At the start of 2008, many market analysts were predicting that global share prices would rise this year, exceeding the record highs seen towards the end of 2007. Instead, we have seen a catastrophic collapse in global equity market value. The FTSE All-World Index, measuring developed and emerging economies, began the year at $34 trillion and proceeded to lose some $17 trillion in wealth.

January began with investor jitters over monoline bond insurance companies (like MBIA and Ambac) who were facing ratings cuts. These small companies guarantee the repayment of bond principal and stood behind many of the credit instruments (like collateralized debt obligations) that were already showing signs of distress. Many forecasters claimed that the monolines would need a significant injection of cash to fend off a collapse.

On January 22, in an attempt to stem global pessimism, the Federal Open Market Committee in the US cut its target federal funds rate by 75 basis points. The dramatic move was largely unanticipated and gave stocks a considerable bounce following the Davos summit in Switzerland. Two days later, officials at the French investment bank Société Générale announced that one of their rogue futures traders had single-handedly lost $7.2b. The news reassured some traders who thought the story might explain the rapid sell-off in January.

The ensuing rally proved to be unconvincing, however, as the dollar lost ground, China and India saw their economies slowing, and the price of oil began its record ascent. By March, another crisis loomed as Bear Stearns, facing insolvency, was forced into a merger with JPMorgan Chase with money supplied by the Fed. Analysts were already concerned about Lehman Brothers, but the financial rescue of Bear led many to believe that policymakers would not allow a major investment bank to fail.

Markets recovered on this sentiment, and rising commodity prices brought on a new fear: inflation. In June, the Fed threatened to raise interest rates, and the European Central Bank (ECB) actually hiked rates 25 basis points in July. These policy measures, mixed with lingering fears in the credit market, quickly snuffed out the year's stock market rally.

The end of the summer brought on a dizzying crisis in the financial markets. Gloomy economic data and credit fears created a toxic mix that led to a giant sell-off of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As their share prices fell, it became more and more difficult for these mortgage institutions to raise capital, which in turn put greater downward pressure on their stock. In July, this negative cycle ultimately forced the US government to announce it would backstop Fannie and Freddie's debt.

The brief inflation scare was now a full-blown recession panic. Trading volumes thinned, hedge funds began to worry about redemptions, and investor confidence was shaky. On September 7, the government nationalized Fannie and Freddie, which sent signals to the market of a worsening crisis. On September 14, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy after the government's reckless experiment with free-market principles. Many observers now point to this moment as the inflection point of an accelerating downturn.

Soon thereafter the huge insurance company AIG asked for a bailout, Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America, and Washington Mutual (the 6th largest bank in the US) failed and was ultimately seized by JPMorgan Chase. News of the government's $700b rescue package briefly lifted stocks, only to be voted down by the House of Representatives on September 29. To make matters worse, European banks were discovered to be more leveraged than their counterparts in America, Iceland's banking system collapsed, and traders the world over couldn't get their money out of Lehman's bankruptcy proceedings.

The tumult of September led to Black October. Curiously, the slew of government rescue packages actually invited speculation against the world economy. The week after Congress passed the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), US stocks suffered their worst 5-day performance since the 1930s. Huge losses forced world governments to pursue more extreme actions. The UK began purchasing direct stakes in its banks to help recapitalization and an array of central governments agreed to a coördinated rate cut.

More aggressive monetary policy had the desired effect, but the rally was short lived. When Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson announced that the US would follow Britain's plan to buy shares in banks (and not purchase distressed mortgage assets) there was widespread panic around Citigroup, which has heavy exposure to mortgage backed securities. Tumbling share prices forced the government to reconsider, and on November 24 it organized the largest bailout in history for Citi. As the crisis wore on, it seemed the policy responses (especially in the United States) were increasingly myopic an ad hoc.

The next shoe to drop was the burst of the foreign exchange bubble. As investors pulled out of risky investments in emerging markets, foreign currencies collapsed and borrowers raced to repay their debts. Forex speculators who were playing the carry trade (borrowing in low-interest currencies to invest in higher yielding ones) were forced to rapidly unwind their positions. The instability in the currency market raised the spectre of a sovereign default in emerging markets. For all those who once believed in "decoupling," 2008 was providing a flawless rebuttal.

As the year ends, there is still great uncertainty regarding the credit markets and the direction of equities in the near term. Many analysts agree that markets will eventually recover, but there are still disagreements over whether a bottom has been printed. Even as lending rate indices return to normal (Libor, Euribor, Tibor were all down in the last week) there is still significant fear in the markets. Treasury yields across the board are trading near historic lows with risk management at a premium.

These problems certainly won't evaporate as the calendar turns to 2009, but there are many traders at least looking for a fresh start.

For Palestinians, Hajj a Matter of Politics

The Hajj is the largest annual pilgrimage in the world. For Muslims, the journey to Mecca is the fifth pillar of Islam, an obligation that every fit and financially able believer must perform at least once in his or her lifetime. In 2008, the holy pilgrimage takes place from December 6-10.

As the Hajj draws to a close today, many observers are relieved that the season has been remarkably uneventful. Over the past decades, the pilgrimage has often been marred by crowd stampedes, and in recent years has been seen as a prime target for terrorist attacks. This season some 2 million Muslims made the journey to the birthplace of the prophet Mohammed at the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

Each year, record numbers embark on this spectacular pilgrimage, as Muslims come from across the globe to perform a series of religious rituals. Saudi authorities, who have become increasingly sophisticated in their efforts to control massive crowds, give a quota to each foreign government that must then select which pilgrims are able to travel to Mecca. For most countries, the process is fairly simple. For Palestinians, however, the ability to participate in the Hajj is wrapped up in a political standoff.

The ongoing power struggle between the left-leaning Fatah Party (which controls the West Bank) and the more hard-line Hamas (which controls the Gaza Strip) has all but paralyzed the Palestinian Authority (PA). This year, the Saudi government only granted visas to pilgrims from the West Bank, a move that underscored the current political tensions. Officials in Riyadh claimed that Palestinians needed to apply for pilgrimage visas through the PA, which is controlled by President Mahmoud Abbas's secular Fatah faction. Still, some 3,000 Palestinians in Gaza had applied and received visas.

In response, Hamas leaders said they would prevent anyone from leaving Gaza to embark on the pilgrimage unless Saudi Arabia offered additional visas. According to news outlets, Hamas set up police checkpoints near the Rafah border crossing into Egypt and turned away prospective travellers and journalists. In conflicting statements, officials at the Hamas-run Interior Ministry in Gaza blamed the Egyptians for keeping the border closed.

Hamas has controlled the Palestinian enclave ever since it managed to repel forces loyal to Fatah in 2007. Moreover, the party enjoys considerable political support among Palestinians (Hamas surprisingly won a January 2006 election). Indeed, for many Western officials, the vote was an example of the vexing democratic trends in the Middle East. Still, Hamas is viewed with skepticism by regional leaders. Conservative Arab regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia look unfavorably on Hamas' violent rejection of the PA, no doubt concerned about their own political stability.

In the immediate aftermath of the Gaza takeover, certain security analysts were concerned that an independent, militant enclave could rekindle the nearby Muslim Brotherhood and establish a stronger anti-Israel coalition with Egypt. For a host of reasons, this seems not to have happened. Egypt rather enjoys its on-again-off-again status as leader of the Arab World, and seems unlikely to challenge Israel (and the redoubtable list of allies) directly.

The real problem with Hamas is that it effectively prevents any lasting peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Israeli officials have no reason to negotiate with the PA, as long as it remains divided. More fundamentally, Hamas' long term strategy (open hostilites with Israel) are incongruent with any lasting agreement. In addition, the physical dislocation of the West Bank and Gaza serves only to exacerbate the strains that prevent any reconciliation.

Western governments have chosen to isolate Gaza, establishing an informal embargo that reinforces the depraved conditions in which many Palestinians live. It's hard to imagine how such a policy decreases the likelihood of terrorism or creates momentum for peace. Given America's strategic failings in the region, the US is no longer "the indispensable nation" when it comes to Middle East diplomacy. Any future negotiations will hopefully include the Saudis, who are proving helpful both in Lebanon and Afghanistan.

The recent events in Gaza are certainly disheartening. In times when divisions within the Islamic world are quite stark, the Hajj represents a brief moment of solidarity. In this part of the world, however, the frustrating bind between religion and politics is all too common.

EULEX Begins in Kosovo

Two months ago, European Union troops rolled into the volatile buffer zones around Georgia's breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Tuesday, some 1,000 miles west across the Black Sea, the EU finally launched its much-delayed police mission in Kosovo. Together, these deployments represent an important test for the EU and its ability to serve as a meaningful force in international peace and security.

Beginning on December 9, hundreds of EU officials will join an international police force designed to resolve the chaotic affairs in Kosovo. The European Rule of Law Mission, more commonly known as EULEX, will take control of police, justice, and customs duties with the support from local staff. No doubt, EULEX will need to address the tactical turmoil that has plagued Kosovo since it declared independence from Serbia in February. While the mission was first approved in December 2007, the intervening months have seen only false starts and operational hangups.

More pressing, however, is the need to combat deep-rooted corruption, a roaring narcotics trade, and human trafficking. Kosovo is strategically located along one of the most lucrative trading routes for heroin and sex-slave smuggling. Drugs from Afghanistan and Central Asia enter Europe from distribution centers in Kosovo. The heroin is often carried across the Adriatic Sea to members of the vast Kosovo Albanian mafia living abroad. Some analysts suggest that these smugglers handle more than 5 tonnes of heroin a month, as it travels to Turkey, Greece, Italy, Germany, and Switzerland. The multi-billion dollar industry is by far the most lucrative in Kosovo.

EULEX is replacing the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) that was operating under a United Nations mandate in the region. The complex web of international bodies that have previously, or are currently, operating in Kosovo can be traced back to the guerrilla war fought in 1998-99. Serbia (who still considers Kosovo to be one of its provinces) has claimed control over the former Ottoman province since 1912. For its part, however, the ethnic Albanian-Kosovo population has continually resisted any assimilation or submission to centralized authority.

These tensions broke open in the final months of 1998, as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) repeatedly attacked Serbian security personnel. NATO bombings, launched under the auspices of humanitarian intervention, also struck Yugoslav military and civilian targets that ultimately forced the Serbian military out of Kosovo. In 1999, once hostilities subdued, KFOR was deployed so as to promote security and assist hundreds-of-thousands of refugees.

EULEX was initially favored by officials in Prishtina, Kosovo's capital city because it was thought to lessen the pressure of the UN. KFOR was closely linked to the UN Security Council, where Russia (a staunch ally of Serbia and opponent of Kosovo's independence) holds veto power. By contrast the EU is dominated by countries that have already recognized Kosovo as an independent state.

Now it seems the mood has changed. Serbia believes it can still influence the EULEX mission through the UN (likely the case, given their organizational overlap). What is more, officials in Prishtina are worried that anti-corruption measures will cost political support among well-connected traffickers and their facilitators. Thus,
it seems EULEX is walking into a very different situation than it envisioned when the force was first drafted.

Belgrade would like EULEX to remain status-neutral on Kosovo. There are perhaps enough countries within the EU that have not recognized Kosovo (chiefly Spain, Greece, and Romania) that this request could be honored. Still it is unlikely that EULEX will be able to make either, let alone both, of these bitter rivals happy. Such conflict could be a serious problem not just for this specific mission, but for the future of EUpeacekeeping operations.

In many respects EULEX is a test case for the European Union. It is the largest-ever mission undertaken by the EU (the startup budget alone is $266m) and takes on vast responsibility for regional development. A failure to deliver in Kosovo would certainly undercut the strategic relevance of EU forces around the globe.

If the last 12 months are any indication, it could be a tough road ahead for Europe.

Mumbai and the Indo-Pak Crisis

By now, the events of a last week's three-day terrorist attack in Mumbai are well known. Islamic operatives carried out a harrowing raid in the Indian port city, killing more than 180 people and injuring close to 300. Even though train and bus bombings have scarred Mumbai's recent past, the attack has sent shock waves throughout the region.

While the precise number of terrorists involved remains unclear, analysts have noted the group's remarkable strategic and operational complexity. This week's intelligence report focused on the threat of advanced weapons (nuclear or biological), which terrorists might use to increase the attention and lethality of their attacks. By contrast, the recent violence in Mumbai stands out because of the elaborate and skillfully planned siege of the city's most recognizable landmarks.

The primary targets for these attacks appeared to be foreigners and Jews. Both the Taj Mahal and the Oberoi Trident, in which hostages were taken, are five-star hotels that attract American and British clientele. Similarly, the nearby Café Leopold was attacked in part because it is popular among well-heeled tourists. The terrorists also assaulted the Chabad-Lubavitch center (a Jewish community space) tucked away in the backstreets of Mumbai.

As a secondary objective, the attacks were designed to terrorize the local population as well. Bomb blasts in the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus station, Mumbai's main rail terminal, and attacks on hospitals in the city affected a much broader cross-section of Indian society. Just yesterday, a whole week after the crisis began, Mumbai police found two unexploded bombs in luggage left behind at the rail station, which were safely detonated.

A group calling itself the Deccan Mujahideen claimed responsibility for the attack, although US officials claim that evidence will more likely implicate Pakistani Islamist militant groups Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed. Militants from these organizations were responsible for the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi that killed 14 people. What is more, reports indicate that one group of terrorists joined the attack after sailing in rubber-dinghies to Mumbai from Karachi, Pakistan.

The combination of high-profile targets and high-traffic civilian infrastructure has led some analysts to suspect al Qaeda is behind the attacks. While it remains possible that the al Qaeda core helped plan the attack, it seems more likely that the organizational masterminds are located in Pakistani franchise groups. Al Qaeda is undoubtedly part of the security nightmare facing Pakistan at the moment, but there are even more sensitive challenges. Some officials believe that the Mumbai attacks were planned with the help of Pakistan's highly secretive and dangerously autonomous Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Even as the details of the siege are under investigation, the political tensions between India and Pakistan are ratcheting up. India's opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has continually criticized the ruling Congress party for being "soft on terrorism." Any perceived reluctance to take a hard-line approach to militancy in Pakistan could haunt the incumbents in the May elections. In recent months, India has suffered a slew of Islamist militant attacks in Delhi, Bangalore, and Jaipur, which have killed more than 150 people. Populist pressures, which are now reaching a critical point, will look to hold someone accountable.

Here's the problem: the recent Mumbai attacks are as much a function of India's security failings as the insidious influence from neighboring Pakistan. Reports showed earlier this week that the US passed two warnings to New Delhi saying an attack was imminent. In addition, a number of Indian officials have been forced to resign for allowing the rather embarrassing performance of various police forces during the crisis.

India, and particularly the ruling Congress party, has political incentive to indict Pakistan. Shifting the blame to its historic rival conveniently ignores the inability of the current Indian government to protect its own citizens. Nevertheless, sabre rattling will only paper over the deep problems that plague the Indo-Pak relationship.

First, these countries have nuclear arsenals which complicate any skirmishes. Many scholars will argue that these weapons keep a lid on cross-border confrontation, as officials in Islamabad and New Delhi are unlikely to start a nuclear war. Still, the very assurance of a nuclear stalemate allows both states to manipulate low-level tensions. This phenomenon usually favors Pakistan (which would be wiped out were it not for its nuclear weapons), but on this occasion India will squeeze Pakistan's government into concessions.

Second, these countries are unlikely to find lasting peace unless there is a true political settlement in Kashmir. The region has caused over 60 years of conflict and bloodshed, often with Muslim Kashmiri separatists trying to expel India (a predominantly Hindu country) from the territory. Both Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have their roots in the Kashmiri struggle, and the region will undoubtedly take center stage in the ensuing political or military fireworks.

Third, the new Pakistani government has yet to prove it can deliver any real security gains. The last few months have seen US officials criticize the inability of Pakistan's military to combat militants along its western border. In response to the Mumbai attacks, India is demanding that Pakistan redirect some 100,000 troops to counter terrorists threats in the east. Philosophically, both the US and India are articulating a similar desire to clamp down on Ismalist militancy in Pakistan. In practice, however, both countries would like Pakistan to deal with the threat in different places.

This is no time to pull the Pakistani government in opposing directions. President Asif Zardari is already in a compromised position (his economy is in shambles and he still faces questions about his political capital) and is now scrambling to assuage Indian authorities. It seems unlikely that the Indo-Pak standoff would reach the levels it did back in 2001, when the US had to broker a sensitive peace deal. Indeed, there has been much progress between the two countries since 2003, when a cease-fire was signed across the Kashmiri line of control.

Political fallout is another matter entirely. The pressures rising in both India and Pakistan could lead to a dramatic change in their respective domestic landscapes. Clearly the Americans will play an active role here. The US dispatched Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to the region, and Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee is set to meet with President-elect Barack Obama in Washington.

It is clear that this crisis will not be solved in a week of shuttle diplomacy. In all likelihood, these negotiations will be ongoing when Mr Obama takes office in January. Still the Mumbai attacks demonstrate that terrorists don't need weapons of mass destruction to make a big splash. They can simply destabilize those countries that do.

Soldiers' Riots Threaten Mugabe's Rule

Skirmishes are nothing new in Zimbabwe's depraved capital, but Sunday's violence in Harare was quite remarkable. Shots rang out in the city center after soldiers grew unruly while queuing at the main branch of the Zimbabwe Allied Banking Group. Witness reports suggest that about 70 uniformed soldiers began rioting late Sunday afternoon when the bank said it had run out of cash. Under government policy, depositors are only allowed to withdraw 500,000 Zimbabwe dollars (about 27¢) from banks per day.

Soldiers looted the bank, smashing windows and harassing employees, and then moved on to assault black-market currency traders in Harare. President Robert Mugabe has stubbornly driven his country into blighting poverty, but until now, the rank-and-file have largely been insulated from pronounced hardships. Rampant cronyism and political payoffs have shifted the strains of hyperinflation away from Mr Mugabe's inner circle and onto Zimbabwe's beleaguered citizens. Sunday's riot, however, sends a strong message that the regime is losing control over the ever-important military.

Soldiers have said there is no food in the barracks, no medical supplies at military hospitals, and increasing frustrations with Mr Mugabe's government. Reports indicate that thousands of desertions have depleted the military's numbers from some 40,000 to 26,000 troops. Mr Mugabe's rule is entirely dependent on these forces and their ability to hold populist uprisings at bay. If soldiers continue to bleed out into the growing pool of disaffected Zimbabweans, a more sustained revolt is in the cards.

To make a bleak situation even worse, much of Harare is without water and is facing a massive cholera outbreak. The disease comes from drinking contaminated water, and Zimbabwe has been suffering from a recent shortage in purification chemicals. Nearly 12,000 cases of cholera have been reported in the country, and the number of deaths is fast approaching 500. In a sign of the widening crisis, the disease is spreading to border towns in neighboring South Africa and Botswana.

Such medical outbreaks are placing even greater strain on limited resources. The South African constitution (one of the most progressive in the world) mandates that all citizens have adequate access to healthcare, a promise aid workers are struggling to meet. Zimbabwean refugees are flooding across the now-contaminated Limpopo River, which forms a natural border between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Back in May, South Africa witnessed violent anti-immigrant riots, many of which targeted Zimbabweans living in the country. The current health crisis could exacerbate existing social tensions.

At the very least, the Harare bank riot dispels any notion that the ruling Zanu-PF party can continue to ignore the opposition. Ever since Mr Mugabe's rival Morgan Tsvarangirai pulled his Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) out of the impotent power-sharing agreement, Zanu-PF officials have attempted to consolidate their power. It appears the frightening realities of Zimbabwe have finally caught up with the country's notorious dictator. For so long, Mr Mugabe lived in a fantasy world where he willfully ignored the plight of those he ruled. With soldiers joining the chorus of dissent, Mr Mugabe must realize that his days are numbered.

Could the rising social unrest lead to a coup? Possibly. But Mr Mugabe still has an inner circle of fiercely loyal generals. In recent weeks, they have meted out harsh punishment against any soldiers suspected of defecting. There are reports that some of the soldiers who have taken part in recent riots have been killed. As a result, Western officials are instead predicting a state of "low-grade anarchy," as order crumbles and the military becomes unable to deal with unrest.

Leaders of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have proven spineless statesmen when dealing with Mr Mugabe. Their failings have turned misery into tragedy, as Zimbabwe plunges into ever-worsening circumstances. In response to the current cholera outbreak (but with eyes on the soldiers' riot) the SADC should call an emergency meeting to address the crisis in Zimbabwe.

As the disease leaks out into the region, heads of state will be forced to confront medical challenges. Let's hope they consider all the political ones as well.