Mumbai and the Indo-Pak Crisis

By now, the events of a last week's three-day terrorist attack in Mumbai are well known. Islamic operatives carried out a harrowing raid in the Indian port city, killing more than 180 people and injuring close to 300. Even though train and bus bombings have scarred Mumbai's recent past, the attack has sent shock waves throughout the region.

While the precise number of terrorists involved remains unclear, analysts have noted the group's remarkable strategic and operational complexity. This week's intelligence report focused on the threat of advanced weapons (nuclear or biological), which terrorists might use to increase the attention and lethality of their attacks. By contrast, the recent violence in Mumbai stands out because of the elaborate and skillfully planned siege of the city's most recognizable landmarks.

The primary targets for these attacks appeared to be foreigners and Jews. Both the Taj Mahal and the Oberoi Trident, in which hostages were taken, are five-star hotels that attract American and British clientele. Similarly, the nearby Café Leopold was attacked in part because it is popular among well-heeled tourists. The terrorists also assaulted the Chabad-Lubavitch center (a Jewish community space) tucked away in the backstreets of Mumbai.

As a secondary objective, the attacks were designed to terrorize the local population as well. Bomb blasts in the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus station, Mumbai's main rail terminal, and attacks on hospitals in the city affected a much broader cross-section of Indian society. Just yesterday, a whole week after the crisis began, Mumbai police found two unexploded bombs in luggage left behind at the rail station, which were safely detonated.

A group calling itself the Deccan Mujahideen claimed responsibility for the attack, although US officials claim that evidence will more likely implicate Pakistani Islamist militant groups Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed. Militants from these organizations were responsible for the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi that killed 14 people. What is more, reports indicate that one group of terrorists joined the attack after sailing in rubber-dinghies to Mumbai from Karachi, Pakistan.

The combination of high-profile targets and high-traffic civilian infrastructure has led some analysts to suspect al Qaeda is behind the attacks. While it remains possible that the al Qaeda core helped plan the attack, it seems more likely that the organizational masterminds are located in Pakistani franchise groups. Al Qaeda is undoubtedly part of the security nightmare facing Pakistan at the moment, but there are even more sensitive challenges. Some officials believe that the Mumbai attacks were planned with the help of Pakistan's highly secretive and dangerously autonomous Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Even as the details of the siege are under investigation, the political tensions between India and Pakistan are ratcheting up. India's opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has continually criticized the ruling Congress party for being "soft on terrorism." Any perceived reluctance to take a hard-line approach to militancy in Pakistan could haunt the incumbents in the May elections. In recent months, India has suffered a slew of Islamist militant attacks in Delhi, Bangalore, and Jaipur, which have killed more than 150 people. Populist pressures, which are now reaching a critical point, will look to hold someone accountable.

Here's the problem: the recent Mumbai attacks are as much a function of India's security failings as the insidious influence from neighboring Pakistan. Reports showed earlier this week that the US passed two warnings to New Delhi saying an attack was imminent. In addition, a number of Indian officials have been forced to resign for allowing the rather embarrassing performance of various police forces during the crisis.

India, and particularly the ruling Congress party, has political incentive to indict Pakistan. Shifting the blame to its historic rival conveniently ignores the inability of the current Indian government to protect its own citizens. Nevertheless, sabre rattling will only paper over the deep problems that plague the Indo-Pak relationship.

First, these countries have nuclear arsenals which complicate any skirmishes. Many scholars will argue that these weapons keep a lid on cross-border confrontation, as officials in Islamabad and New Delhi are unlikely to start a nuclear war. Still, the very assurance of a nuclear stalemate allows both states to manipulate low-level tensions. This phenomenon usually favors Pakistan (which would be wiped out were it not for its nuclear weapons), but on this occasion India will squeeze Pakistan's government into concessions.

Second, these countries are unlikely to find lasting peace unless there is a true political settlement in Kashmir. The region has caused over 60 years of conflict and bloodshed, often with Muslim Kashmiri separatists trying to expel India (a predominantly Hindu country) from the territory. Both Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have their roots in the Kashmiri struggle, and the region will undoubtedly take center stage in the ensuing political or military fireworks.

Third, the new Pakistani government has yet to prove it can deliver any real security gains. The last few months have seen US officials criticize the inability of Pakistan's military to combat militants along its western border. In response to the Mumbai attacks, India is demanding that Pakistan redirect some 100,000 troops to counter terrorists threats in the east. Philosophically, both the US and India are articulating a similar desire to clamp down on Ismalist militancy in Pakistan. In practice, however, both countries would like Pakistan to deal with the threat in different places.

This is no time to pull the Pakistani government in opposing directions. President Asif Zardari is already in a compromised position (his economy is in shambles and he still faces questions about his political capital) and is now scrambling to assuage Indian authorities. It seems unlikely that the Indo-Pak standoff would reach the levels it did back in 2001, when the US had to broker a sensitive peace deal. Indeed, there has been much progress between the two countries since 2003, when a cease-fire was signed across the Kashmiri line of control.

Political fallout is another matter entirely. The pressures rising in both India and Pakistan could lead to a dramatic change in their respective domestic landscapes. Clearly the Americans will play an active role here. The US dispatched Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to the region, and Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee is set to meet with President-elect Barack Obama in Washington.

It is clear that this crisis will not be solved in a week of shuttle diplomacy. In all likelihood, these negotiations will be ongoing when Mr Obama takes office in January. Still the Mumbai attacks demonstrate that terrorists don't need weapons of mass destruction to make a big splash. They can simply destabilize those countries that do.