Israel's Real Threat

During Russia's August war in Georgia, the geopolitical firmament was suddenly revised. Great powers were once again engaged in bare knuckles realpolitik, which has left lingering questions about Moscow's relations with the West. While Americans and Europeans were most vocal in their efforts to check the Kremlin, Israel was working carefully behind the scenes to appease Russia. 

Israeli advisors were in Georgia during the hostilities, and Israel has reportedly sold some $500m worth of military equipment to the Tbilisi government over the past ten years. In late 2007, however, Israeli intelligence analysts saw escalating tensions between Russia and Georgia and moved to disaffiliate themselves from the impending showdown. Before Georgian President Saakashvili sent tanks into South Ossetia, Israel announced that it had frozen arms shipments to the Caucasus. 

By most secondary accounts (Israel does not officially discuss its weapons deals), the Israeli decision was designed to curry favor with the Kremlin. Indeed, Russia is considered a critical player in the insurance of Israel's broader security in the Muslim world. No doubt officials in Jerusalem are wary of Russian ambitions to sell S-300 air defense missiles to Iran.

These most recent political calculations prompt a review of Israel's most pressing national security challenges. Generally, the are three major concerns: Palestinians living inside the post-1967 borders, "confrontation states" on its borders, and Israel's relationship with Arab and Muslim states in the region. It is through these lenses that Israel begins to orchestrate its foreign policy with the US, Europe, Russia, and other powers.

Without belittling the human tragedy of terrorism, the Palestinians do not represent an existential threat to Israel. Suicide attacks have long outraged Israeli citizens, and their recurrence will sap political morale. In turn, Palestinians have extracted certain concessions from the Jewish state (prisoner releases, dismantling Israeli outposts) which should not be overlooked. Nevertheless, the ongoing power struggle between Fatah and Hamas has hamstrung Palestinian efforts to effectively negotiate with Israel. Officials in Jerusalem will always consider a cessation of violence as a pretext for discussions on Palestinian statehood. At present, no Palestinian figure has the political capital, much less the realistic ability, to make such a guarantee. Consequently, Israel's "core interests" are relatively unthreatened by the Palestinians living inside its borders.

Relations with the "confrontation states" are complicated but predominantly positive. Israel has peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, both of which are open enemies of Hamas. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak must contend with the opposition Muslim Brotherhood, an offshoot of Hamas, which hopes to overthrow his secular regime. While Mr Mubarka's tone is sometimes confrontational, his rhetoric belies a strategic alliance against Islamic extremism. 

Jordan's relationship with Israel has been friendly since 1970, when the Palestinian Liberation Organization attempted to overthrow the Hashemite regime. What is more, Jordanians privately depend on both the Americans and Israelis for its own national security. As a result, Amman and Jerusalem have established a constructive relationship vis-à-vis the Palestinians.

Israel has no formal relations with Syria, although it does have certain understandings with Damascus about portions of Lebanon. To be frank, Syria's main interests are in Lebanon rather than Israel, and end up working with groups like Hezbollah rather than Hamas. Such projects can flare up from time to time (see Israel's 2006 war with Hezbollah), but Damascus lacks the resources to challenge Israel. 

Finally, the political framework within Beirut is such a mess that Lebanon cannot itself have functional state-to-state relations, but the Israelis have productive contacts with certain Lebanese factions.

That leaves the broader Muslim world, which any sampling of press clippings would describe as a precarious environment. In reality, Israel has an impressive lattice of formal strategic alliances or informal relations. Official agreements with Turkey (the strongest Muslim country in the region) and Morocco complement a host of off-the-record arrangements with the conservative monarchies in the Arabian peninsula. These regimes are deeply distrustful of Hamas, which helped organize the Nasserite Pan-Arab socialist movement in the 1970s and 80s. In Dubai, many Israeli businessmen are negotiating defense contracts with these Arab monarchies under 3rd-party passports. 

The real challenge for Israel is Iran. Should President Ahmadinejad somehow acquire a deliverable nuclear weapon, his unsavory remarks about the existence of Israel may well demand a new security strategy. Whether or not Iran would engage in an undoubtedly suicidal nuclear attack is unclear. The fact that such a scenario is Israel's worst nightmare is not.

And so the Israelis will pull all the right levers to keep weapons out of Iran. Even when the US was pressing against Russia, PM Ehud Olmert flew to Moscow to smooth over his country's relationship with the Kremlin. For all the talk of the American-Israeli relationship, US military aid to the Jewish state is minimal. The annual $2.5bn in weapons and technology has remained relatively constant since the US began working with Israel. In 1974, the US arms deal constituted 20% of Israeli GDP; today that figure is 2%. Israel broadcasts its relationship with America largely in an effort to harness US military suasion. 

Contrary to the bluster of its enemies, Israel has a security stronghold in the Middle East. But the position is compromised if Russia begins to supply Israel's enemies. As the West looks to form a united front against Messrs Medmedev and Putin, expect Israel's next PM to make new friends in Moscow.