In Pyongyang, Brinkmanship Pays

There is a laundry list of daunting tasks that await the next American president. He must ease the financial crisis, manage two difficult wars, and perform the sort of diplomatic stagecraft that will counter regional hegemons in Russia and China. Now add the nuclear standoff in North Korea.

President George Bush will bequeath a number of foreign policy headaches to his successor, but the crisis in Pyongyang should not be one. In recent days, North Korea has expelled  United National atomic inspectors from its Yongbyon nuclear facility and announced plans to restart its bomb-making enrichment process. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said that the North Koreans had removed seals and surveillance cameras from the Yongbyon plant and intend to reactivate the Soviet-era facility next week.

These developments signal a breakdown in the disarmament-for-aid negotiations, which began back in 2003. The six-party talks were deadlocked until October 2007 when North Korea agreed to disable its main nuclear reactor and fully disclose the details of its nuclear program to the IAEA. In exchange, the cash-strapped regime would receive economic aid and heavy fuel oil from neighboring South Korea. As added incentive, the Bush administration announced that compliance from the Pyongyang would see the North taken off the US state sponsors of terrorism list.

Washington delayed the move, however, as the North Koreans failed to agree on verification standards outlined by the IAEA. In doing so, the US unwittingly provided the North with a way out of the scheduled disarmament. Last month, Pyongyang claimed that denuclearization talks had failed, and this week moved to resume its nuclear program. Such heightened defiance of the international community represents a serious blow to the administration's efforts to halt weapons proliferation.

Surely, this comes at no surprise. Brinkmanship, in which a negotiating party leverages the threat of disaster to secure a favorable outcome, has been a core principle in Pyongyang's nuclear strategy. In an effort to win concessions from the international community, North Korea has frequently pushed the nuclear standoff to the brink. In 2006, the North tested long-range ballistic missiles and later staged a partially successful test of a nuclear weapon. These actions take North Korea farther away from the negotiating table, which means nonproliferators must offer even greater incentives for it to come back. 

Given the current approach to the negotiations, the North stands to gain more from brinkmanship than coöperation. Indeed, Pyongyang has benefitted from America's ad hoc nuclear policy, successfully exploiting subtle rifts in the international community. In addition, a slew of larger, more immediate problems have allowed North Korea to operate in the shadows of political consciousness. It is to be expected that the North will periodically make noise enough to extract lucrative (and much needed) aid packages. 

Pyonyang's announcement this week is essentially a scare tactic designed to piggy-back on recent fears about Kim Jong Il's health and the stability of the regime. The US and its allies should not rush to appease the North. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked, "We have been through ups and downs in this process before." But as Washington pushes for the standardization of nuclear monitoring procedures, it must likewise clarify its own position on nuclear proliferation. Accommodating India, isolating Iran, and neglecting North Korea is no way to forge a coherent strategy.

For the moment, Russia and China view North Korea as a potential threat to stability in the region and will make their own moves to keep Pyongyang in check. Nonetheless, with a looming succession of leadership in the North, Washington should be prepared to bring a renewed focus to the negotiating table. 

The will be a lot of questions for the new American president. This is one he should get right.