Strange Goodbyes in Anbar

On Monday, the US military officially handed over Anbar Province to Iraqi security forces at a modest ceremony in Ramadi. After a major insurgency by al Qaeda threatened to wrest control of Anbar from the Americans in 2006, the strategic province has seen a precipitous drop in violence. As the first Sunni Arab province to undergo this transition (security control had previously been ceded in 10 of 18 provinces in Iraq), there was indeed reason to celebrate. 

Unfortunately for locals, such revelries are likely to take place in Washington and behind the well-fortified walls of the Green Zone. The handover of power is a major political victory for the embattled American President and for Iraqi PM Nouri al Maliki. Mr Bush is slowly solidifying a legacy of success for the "surge," a luxury his own tenure in office has almost assuredly squandered. And Mr Maliki appears to have revived his once-languid position in office and strengthened his hand against opposition forces in the Iraqi government. More importantly, Mr Maliki has gained the political capital to confront the Americans on the so-called "status of forces agreement" (SOFA) that will help return sovereignty to the Iraqi government. 

But there is a decidedly different tone in the Sunni neighborhoods across Anbar Province. In late 2006, many Sunni tribal leaders grew disenchanted with the brutal violence and rigid fundamentalism of al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. An organization of ad hoc security forces (led by local Sheikhs) spawned the more widely recognized Anbar Awakening. This indigenous movement was later encouraged by the Americans (effectively outsourcing the conflict against al Qaeda), but retained its regional character. Consequently, the resolution in Ramadi has failed to address the serious grievances of Sunni leaders in Anbar.

On the one hand, Awakening members feel that they are being excluded from the emerging Iraqi security forces. Mr Maliki has long been wary of the movement, and considers many of its militia members to be a front for the al Qaeda groups sowing his demise. As a result, the army and police have dismantled Awakening forces, arresting many of its leaders. 

In addition to their security concerns, the Awakening council is locked in a power struggle with the ruling Islamic Party, which has the backing of Mr Maliki. In 2005, Sunni leaders largely boycotted the provincial elections allowing the Islamic Party to win 36 of 41 seats. The next round of voting is slated to take place in November (although a cloud of bureaucratic delays threatens the process), and this time the Awakening council is eager to challenge for political influence. Given the compromised security position of its leaders, many in the council say that the chances for a fair election are slim. Awakening members are arguing that they need US troops to stay in Anbar to prevent fraud and violence. 

It is easy to see why the US is desperate to leave Iraq. And while provincial handovers demonstrate the nascent competence of the Iraqi government, they are no substitute for the security guarantees US troops have provided since the start of the surge. Iraq still has all the ingredients for an unconscionable civil war: heavy weapons, a feeble state, and a concatenation of sectarian rivalries. Should American forces leave this tinderbox in haste, it may not be the oil that flows. Waves of bloodletting would likely crash across this most sensitive region.