In 22 countries, the war on terror was deemed to have failed in its effort to weaken al Qaeda, the prime target of the Bush administration. On average, 29% of respondents believed the campaign has had no effect on al Qaeda while 30% contend that it has made the jihadist network stronger. While most countries had a negative view of al Qaeda, this trend was reversed in Egypt and Pakistan, two of America's most important allies in fighting terrorism. In these states, many more respondents had mixed or favorable opinions of al Qaeda (in Egypt only 35% had negative feelings towards the organization, and in Pakistan this figure was a remarkably low 19%).
Even in the US, where the public has been inundated with the political messages that prioritize the war on terror, only 34% of respondents thought al Qaeda had been weakened as a result. A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that the war in Iraq has rejuvenated the organization and the failure to clamp down on Pakistan's tribal areas has allowed al Qaeda to reconstitute its pre-9/11 capabilities.
Still, it is important to consider what analysts mean when they speak of "al Qaeda." For some, the jihadist movement is effectively understood as a monolithic hierarchy. From this perspective, al Qaeda appears stronger now because the organization has followers acting in various countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. There are others, however, who argue that al Qaeda must be understood as a composite of three distinct entities: the core, the franchise groups, and homegrown movements.
The al Qaeda core refers to Osama bin Laden and his close, trusted associates like his strategist Ayman al-Zawahiri. These individuals are highly skilled professionals, often with connections to the organization's historical campaigns in Afghanistan (against the Soviets) and Africa (against the US). The core is responsible for issuing jihadist propaganda, operating terrorist training camps, and masterminding spectacular attacks like 9/11.
At the franchise level stand groups like al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and other known affiliates throughout the Middle East. These organizations have contact with the core, but have the resources and leadership to act independently. Indeed, the relationship does not always suggest allegiance to a central command structure. Back in 2005, Mr al-Zawahiri sent a detailed letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the erstwhile al Qaeda leader in Iraq. The message reprimanded Mr al-Zarqawi for the scenes of gruesome violence (often with Muslim victims) that were coming out of Iraq. Such an exchange reveals a certain amount of tension between the core and its marquee franchise.
Finally, there are homegrown terrorist cells, many of which have sprung up in European cities with disaffected Muslim populations. These groups have often been inspired by the core, but have little connection to the organization's strategic command. In recent years, government officials in the UK have been fought (with limited success) the rise of fundamentalism in Britain's Islamic community.
Since 2001, the intense manhunt for Messrs bin Laden and al-Zawahiri has weakened the ability of the al Qaeda core to command a visible presence in the jihadist movement. Misguided policies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan may well afford these individuals a return to prominence, but for the moment their capabilities have eroded.
Whatever weakening has been experienced by the core is offset by the growing strength of al Qaeda's franchises. Recent developments in the Middle East have shown a resurgence among AQIM, the Yemeni affiliates (who last month orchestrated an attack on the US embassy in Sanaa), and al Qaeda groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan. These franchises are well organized and capable of acting with deadly precision. Still, many analysts argue that the success which such groups enjoy on the domestic front does not translate into a coördinated global jihad. Indeed, al Qaeda franchises struggle to project their attacks to the so-called "far enemy" in the US and Europe.
Homegrown jihadists may well outnumber the members in franchise groups and the al Qaeda core, and their goals are often very ambitious. Their motivation, however, is in most cases undercut by their lack of resources. While the members of this broader movement are closer to the softer, civilian targets in the US and Europe, they lack the equipment and planning to stage massive attacks. This is not to suggest their actions are without serious consequences to the communities they inhabit. Indeed, both the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 2005 London attacks were carried out by groups that had no direct contact with the al Qaeda core.
As the relative capabilities of the organization change, it is important to recognize the bifurcation in the counterterrorism battlespace. On the one hand, there is a campaign designed to limit the al Qaeda's physical strength. This project involves the conventional instruments of military power and the strategic complexities of insurgent warfare. On the other hand, there is an ongoing conflict in the ideological battlespace. That is to say, al Qaeda invests heavily in propaganda to recruit new jihadists and globalize their agenda. In the process, the organization is able offset any losses it incurs in the physical war against American forces.
Al Qaeda has long understood the implication of a war that is fought with physical and ideological resources. Just last month, al Qaeda's religious authority Abu Yahya al-Libi was seen on a video explaining that the jihadist battle is waged "first and foremost at the level of doctrine. Mr al-Libi went on to decry the perversion of "true Islam" in countries like Saudi Arabia that have ties to the US. His comments suggested that Muslims should eschew King Abdullah's moderate religious establishment in favor of al Qaeda's teachings.
The US, by virtue of its "hearts and minds" initiatives, is also aware of the need to engage the Muslim world ideologically. But these public diplomacy projects do not take place in a vacuüm. Instead, the realities of the physical battlespace have a significant effect on developments in the ideological balance. The persistent images of American forces occupying Iraq (particularly the senseless bloodshed that the war has wrought) make it difficult for the US to gain traction with disaffected Muslims.
As one war begins to unwind (however precariously), another is poised to escalate. The US is currently working with Pakistan to fight insurgents hiding in that country's mountainous border with Afghanistan. No doubt these initiatives will demand strategic investment in the physical battlespace. Over the past seven years, however, unmanned drones, air strikes, and foot patrols have seen only limited success. The American and NATO forces must find a way to strengthen their ideological campaign in the region. Embarrassing the Pakistanis with cross-border raids is certainly a step in the wrong direction.
Three recent events in Pakistan provide some conflicting information as to who is winning this ideological struggle. First, in December 2007, opposition leader Benazir Bhutto was assassinated at a political rally, and Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, and al Qaeda commander claimed responsibility for the attack. Many analysts believe that Ms Bhutto was murdered on account of her connections to the US. Second, in July a suicide bomber blew himself up near the Red Mosque in Islamabad (which had been the stage of a bloody gun battle between government forces and students last year) in an apparent revenge attack. Finally, on September 20, a truck with 1000 kg of explosives rocked the symbolic Marriott hotel in Islamabad. The attack killed 60 people and targeted the new Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, who had been scheduled to dine there.
These events point to the physical power of al Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan, but they may also shift the ideological landscape. Some analysts predict that the Marriott bombing, which disrupted the holy month of Ramadan, will serve as a watershed moment in Pakistan and rally popular support against jihad.
Terrorism is a frightening and unfortunate reality in the modern world. Americans seem somewhat new to this idea, unlike Europeans who have protracted experience with separatist groups like the IRA and ETA. Officials in Washington cannot afford to think of the jihadist movement as a monolithic threat, but must consider the varying faces of al Qaeda-style terrorism. Failure to do so will certainly undermine any progress in the physical and ideological campaigns against the organization.
The BBC survey illustrates a grave weakness in US foreign policy. For the next president, this will be one of the first polls he must address.
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