Iraq: Status of SOFA

In times of crisis, the democratic process is often bypassed in favor of political expedience. In the United States, the financial turmoil has given Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson vast fiduciary powers, many of which are unimaginable in calmer economic seas. In Iraq, a rapidly approaching security deadline may compromise parliament's oversight of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

The UN mandate which allows the US military presence in Iraq is set to expire in December. Previously, such year-to-year mandates had been approved by the UN Security Council, without Iraqi input. At the end of 2007, internal pressures for an American withdrawal were irresistible. Mr Maliki was forced to open bilateral negotiations with the US, in the hopes that a new status of forces agreement(SOFA) could be reached.

Media outlets have received various drafts of the new SOFA, but the final document is still unsigned. Indeed, there are significant objections from Iraqi members of parliament, the influential Moktada al-Sadr, and major figures from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC). In September, Sunni religious leaders issued a fatwa declaring that the agreement should be rejected. The array of opposition presents a significant hurdle to both American and Iraqi officials trying to hammer out a deal.

Text from an earlier leaked agreement may provide Mr Maliki with a quick, if highly controversial, way to sidestep such political obstacles. The agreement reportedly states that the document becomes effective once "diplomatic memos confirming all constitutional procedures have been met in both countries are exchanged." The Bush administration has taken the approach that the SOFA is a bilateral executive matter not subject to congressional review. It appears Mr Maliki could take a similar approach in Iraq, thus cutting out his opponents.

The Iraqi PM is in a curious position. He knows that rising nationalism and anti-American sentiment will eventually force all US troops from his country. He also knows that his own political future is highly dependent on short-term military support from the Americans. Thus, the agreement outlines a window of opportunity during which Mr Maliki can consolidate his position as an Iraqi strongman.

The SOFA states that US forces will pull back from Iraqi cities and villages by June 30, 2009 and then fully withdraw by December 31, 2011. It is a convenient timeline for Mr Maliki. American troops will be largely out of sight by next summer, allaying heated concerns among Sadrists, but still able to support the prime minister in the foreseeable future. Interestingly, Mr Maliki appears uninterested in the sort of broad reconciliation process that the US is pushing. Issues of oil revenue sharing, federalism, provision of services, disputed territories, and aid to refugees have failed to gain traction within the Maliki administration. Instead, the prime minister appeals to the US for help amassing his own power. 

Regional analysts suggest that Iran, for better or worse, has had a heavy hand in the negotiations. With leverage over the Sadrists, the Shiite Daawa party, and the SIIC, Tehran is a major stakeholder in Iraq's political process. On Tuesday, head of the US joint chiefs-of-staff Admiral Michael Mullen said the Iran was doing its best to scupper the status of forces agreement. This is unlikely. Iran certainly enjoys America's struggles in Iraq, but would like to see a strong Shiite government (à la Mr Maliki) ruling in Baghdad. A phased withdrawal gives the Iranians a relatively stable neighbor and a chance to gradually ramp up its formal influence in Iraq. 

American frustrations with the Iraqi political process are now palpable. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that American forces would have to "basically stop doing anything" if the SOFA was not signed. Such overt pressure on Mr Maliki and his government cannot help the process. Only the Kurds (some 15% of the population) and small fraction of US-backed Sunni and Shiite political groups actually want American troops to remain in Iraq. Last weekend, 50,000 protesters marched from Sadr City to Baghdad demanding an immediate end to the US occupation.

Back in 2007, British troops were convinced by the Maliki government that their presence in Basra was an irritant in the spiraling violence. Those forces pulled out of major population centers and concentrated at the airport, a move that was seen to have positive effects on security. American officials should understand that an overwhelming visible (or audible) presence in Iraq is counterproductive to its objectives. Efforts to coerce the parliament into passing the SOFA will surely backfire, in the face of concerns about national sovereignty.

There are some serious issues in this new document: sweeping immunity for US troops, coördinated command and control with the Iraqis, and the end of unilateral searches, detentions, and arrests by the American military. The obvious sensitivity of these issues does not lend itself to bluster from ranking officials. The clock is running, but this is no time to be rash.