Last Chance for Transatlantic Agenda-Setting

Last month, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs made an interesting point about the American election in November. In a conversation with the Council on Foreign Relations, David Miliband stated, "I think you can make a pretty good case that this is the last US presidential election that gives the winner the chance, with the European Union, to use the transatlantic alliance to forge and define a global foreign policy agenda." 

For the past few weeks, commentators have describe the American economy as being on the brink of collapse. So too, it seems, is the prospect of American exceptionalism. Mr Miliband was careful to note that the US is still the only global superpower and may well remain "superordinary" for the next 20 years. And yet, he suggests it is practically impossible that the transatlantic relationship will be able to set an inclusive global agenda in eight years. 

This is not to say that the alliance will be irrelevant. Washington's partnership with capitals across Europe will help set a hemispheric agenda, still with significant economic and military resources. But the idea that the West's global supremacy can continue, even its its current diluted form, fails to recognize the critical changes in the international system. Within Europe, this new order might seem more familiar: multipolarity defined nineteenth-century international relations from the Napoleonic Wars to the Crimean War. For the US, however, the systemic overhaul will be more jarring. 

There are several factors that currently frustrate America's effort to set the global "rules of the road." Some are the result of organic shifts in the centers of power. Mr Miliband explained these transitions as moving from West to East, from national to international institutions, and from governments to people. This revolution is fueled by technological innovation, which has created a global consciousness and connectedness among previously isolated populations. 

Other factors stem from imperial overreach. The political, economic, and military foundations of American authority are strained on account of failed domestic and foreign policy. For decades, the US has been living beyond its means. The national debt is hurtling towards $10t, against a $14t economy. American families have picked up the same spendthrift habits, as household debt now exceeds 133% of disposable income. 

Such profligacy has been underwritten by foreign central banks. The current financial crisis has burned overseas investors that bought American debt, and they will surely think twice before extending further loans. The looming budgetary strains will cause a significant reassessment of national priorities (foremost, defense and entitlement programs) for policy makers in Washington.

America's behavior outside its borders is equally disturbing. In response to the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration launched an open-ended war that ostensibly combined national security and national building. Unfortunately, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have done little of either. While certain military pressures have compromised al Qaeda's core leadership, a heavy American footprint in the Middle East has inflamed anti-American sentiment and homegrown jihadists across the globe. 

America's war on terror has been compromised by a certain reckless audacity. Can one really expect to forcibly export democracy to the Islamic world, which numbers some 1.4 billion people? The challenge of bringing order, stability, and the protection of individual rights to the Middle East, and indeed much of the developing world, is critically important. But in the years to come, this will be a multilateral project.

As a result, Europe and America will have to work with other nations to tackle the issues of shared global risk. Within the UN Security Council, China and Russia have repeatedly frustrated efforts to set an agenda for Sudan, Burma, and Zimbabwe. More recently, P-5 member states have failed to speak with one voice on nuclear non-proliferation and the International Criminal Court. Leaders in the US and the EU must work with rising powers so as to preserve the fundamental legitimacy of multilateral institutions. 

Toward the end of his conversation, Mr Miliband reminded his audience that America is "still a country with huge ability to be a force for good around the world." There is an air of embarrassment about American foreign policy, but the US is still a major architect of the global foreign policy agenda. Clearly, Americans and Europeans will find it more difficult to shape the international system down the road. In the next eight years, however, they must work together to encourage all nations to become responsible stakeholders in the global order. 

Such an assignment will require more than a little political dexterity for leaders in Europe and the US. If America is to seize this final window of opportunity, the next president must first rehabilitate European alliances. The world faces an increasing number of challenges that have no military solution. As a result, there must be a significant investment in diplomatic efforts on both sides of the Atlantic.