For Karzai, Trouble Is Family Affair

An Afghan informant for the US Drug Enforcement Administration is causing quite a stir from his prison cell in Kabul. Counternarcotics and intelligence officials recently confirmed that Hajji Aman Kheri had been supplying information about drug trafficking in the capital city. Mr Kheri was arrested last year on charges that he was involved in a 2002 plot to assassinate the Afghan vice president. The lack of evidence recently triggered the Afghan Supreme Court to order his release, but Mr Kheri remains behind bars. Last month, his supporters rallied in protest of the continued incarceration, claiming that Mr Kheri was being held for political reasons. 

Back in 2006, Mr Kheri tipped off American and Afghan officials who seized a truck carrying 110 lbs of heroin. The shipment was linked to a bodyguard for Ahmed Wali Karzai, the younger brother of the Afghan president. In 2004, Mr Karzai's younger brother was implicated in another narcotrafficking arrest. After a cache of heroin was confiscated in Kandahar, the commander who had impounded the truck received a call from Ahmed Wali Karzai and a presidential aide asking him to release the vehicle.

Both President Karzai and his younger brother claim that these allegations are cooked up by political enemies, hoping to discredit the government. Nevertheless, officials within the Bush administration and the intelligence community are afraid of the real possibility that Ahmed Wali Karzai is not only connected to the drug trade, but actively protected by the Afghan president. American policy in Afghanistan has taken a hard line approach to the opium trade, and such complicity in the Karzai government would compromise domestic credibility. 

Most analysts suggest that the rich profits of the drug trade are effectively the only source of revenue in Afghanistan. The state (which, at this point, exists only as an intellectual construct) is under siege from local Taliban officials and heavily armed traffickers. In recent days, alarming excerpts of a draft National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Afghanistan have leaked to the press. In the report, which represents a consensus view of America's 16 intelligence agencies, it is clear that American officials have grave doubts about the current Afghan government. 

In Afghanistan, political hot water is truly a family affair. In addition to Ahmen Wali Karzai, the Afghan president must also deal with the revelation that his older brother, Qayum Karzai, recently met with Taliban officials. According to senior diplomatic sources, Qayum Karzai had a secret dinner with several leaders of the Taliban insurgency and Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif. The event, which has been described as a religious and social gathering, was hosted by King Abdullah in Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis have historically been the financial backers for the Taliban (though their role is now diminished) and insurgents launch their attacks against American and Afghan forces from safe havens in Pakistan's border region. Thus, it would appear that a meeting of these parties could begin to sketch out a negotiated settlement that would quell violence in the region.

Additional reports suggest that extensive talks have been taking place between representatives of President Karzai and the militant leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. After receiving extensive support from the CIA in the 1980s, Mr Hekmatyar is now considered a "global terrorist" by the US. In May 2002, American forces tried to kill the former Mujaheddin leader with a Predator drone carrying antitank missiles, near Kabul.

Afghan leaders appear to be paving the way for negotiations with Mr Hekmatyar, who leads the Hezb-i-Islami fighters. Three months ago, Mr Hekmatyar's son-in-law, Dr Ghairat Baheer was released after six years in prison, a move that has brought both men closer to the negotiating table. Such events illustrate that the Afghan government is searching desperately for a non-military solution to its spiraling crisis. 

Diplomatic overtures to even the most unsavory militants may well be necessary in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to doubt these specific back channel negotiations. Mr Hekmatyar is an unlikely peace broker as he has poor relations with Taliban religious leader Mullah Omar. The Saudis have phased out their direct contacts with Taliban officials, and the residual connections may prove difficult to reign in. What is more, the Saudi intelligence community still deeply resents the fact that Mr Omar reneged on his 1998 pledge to turn over Osama bin Laden. 

In a manner befitting Washington, the final draft of the NIE will not be released until after the election. That is unfortunate. Policy makers in the US and NATO need every possible resource to craft a comprehensive new strategy in Afghanistan. Militarily, the war is one will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to win. The situation is far different from Iraq, a wealthier country with superior infrastructure and organization. The indigenous factors that allowed for recent security gains in Baghdad simply to not exist in Afghanistan.

Oil revenues have certainly bolstered Iraq's long-term prospects for rehabilitation, and there are some analysts who hope the poppy crop could do the same in Afghanistan. The vast shortfall of painkilling medications in the developing world represents a market opportunity for Afghan producers. In the 1960s, Turkey was a major source of illegal heroin, but by 1974, the country was a licensed exporter of the raw materials that are turned into medical morphine and codeine. Turkey now enjoys earnings of some $60m per year on its opium crop.

Country reports suggest that more than 2 million Afghans are dependent on poppy production, despite its black market status. Transitioning opium to a legal crop seems like a promising idea. Indeed, the British based Senlis Council has suggested that the UK and US should buy up all the poppy crop to be harvest legally. If such a plan were to succeed, however, the Afghan government would first have to address the security threat posed by existing narcotraffickers, which include the Taliban. Drug lords would either pay higher prices than the government (knowing they could still turn a profit on black markets in the West) or violently seize large swathes of opium-producing land.

Clearly, the country's problems are nightmarish. For too long, the Bush administration pretended it had succeeded in Afghanistan while it tried to deal with ongoing failures in Iraq. The reality of two woefully conducted wars is now unavoidable. Recent stories about the Karzai government (and its relations) are unsettling, though the problems are certainly not all self-made. Still the US needs to have a willing and able partner in Kabul, and credibility among the Afghan population is at a premium.

The next presidential elections in Afghanistan will take place in the second-half of 2009. The next US president will still be new to the job, but he had better have some idea about what to tell the winner.